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Abstract 1 
Scholarship on sports stadium subsidies has covered myriad topics, including economic impact, 2 
finance, political strategy, and voter behavior. One area receiving much less attention from 3 
researchers is the emergence of the no-vote subsidy—where stadium-finance decisions are 4 
decided without a public vote—as a frequent alternative to direct democracy (i.e., referendums or 5 
initiatives). In this article, it is contended that an unfavorable no-vote subsidy can have damaging 6 
effects on a team’s financial performance, the reputation of elected officials, and citizen 7 
confidence in the democratic process. Whereas previous analyses of stadium-subsidy debates 8 
often end with a voting outcome (i.e., the issue is passed or rejected), the conceptual model 9 
presented in this article explores how attitudes toward a no-vote stadium subsidy are formed, and 10 
how these attitudes can have widespread effects on a number of individuals, groups, and 11 
institutions.  12 
Keywords: public policy, political science, public subsidies, public sports facilities, sport 13 
finance, stadium construction 14 
15 
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No-Vote Stadium Subsidies and the Democratic Response 1 
The contribution of the professional sports stadium (e.g., arena, ballpark, football or 2 
soccer stadium) to its city has long been debated by team owners, elected officials, scholars, 3 
activists, fans, sportswriters, and ordinary citizens. This debate intensifies whenever the 4 
possibility of publicly funding a stadium’s construction or renovation is raised. When it comes to 5 
the question of public investment in the US, researchers have focused on voter decision-making 6 
and the tools of direct democracy (i.e., the referendum and initiative; Brown & Paul, 2002; 7 
Dehring, Depken, & Ward, 2008; Mondello & Anderson, 2004). Historically, however, stadium 8 
referendums and initiatives are relatively rare; since 2005, for example, over 30 North American 9 
stadium projects have been allocated over $8.5 billion of public funds without any form of voter 10 
approval (Kellison & Mondello, 2014; Long, 2013). In this article, the practice of allocating 11 
public funds toward a project without direct public consent is referred to as a no-vote subsidy. In 12 
the absence of ballot results or poll numbers, policymakers can presume the public’s will to 13 
reflect their own preferences. However, it may also be possible that the enacted policies do not 14 
correspond to the wishes of the electorate. 15 
Recent stadium developments in Atlanta, Detroit, Edmonton, Minneapolis, and 16 
Washington, DC, illustrate the latest instances of no-vote subsidies in North America (City of 17 
Edmonton, 2013; Karoub, 2013; Kellison & Mondello, 2014; O’Connell 2013, Tucker & Suggs, 18 
2013). A review of the stadium-financing literature illustrates that scholarly inquiry, though 19 
extensive, has been limited mostly to studies focusing on economics, finance, or urban regime 20 
theory (cf. Kellison & Mondello, 2014). Perhaps because of the lack of available data on no-vote 21 
subsidies, researchers have also largely neglected discussions of these cases. Additionally, 22 
investigations of voter characteristics and behavior in stadium-financing issues have failed to 23 
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look beyond voting outcomes. In this study, a serious paucity in the literature is addressed by 1 
underscoring the no-vote subsidy and considering how this entire stadium-financing process may 2 
change voters’ attitudes toward an array of individuals, groups, and institutions. 3 
The purposes of this study are to consider how a citizen’s favorability or unfavorability 4 
toward a public-financing plan is formed and to theorize the public response to such financing 5 
decisions. Two research questions (RQs) are proposed to achieve these aims. First, it is necessary 6 
to pinpoint the factors that influence a citizen’s attitude toward a stadium-financing plan 7 
approved without the public’s direct consent. Although there is reason to suspect that citizens 8 
would oppose policymakers’ allocation of taxpayer dollars without a public vote, some factors 9 
may contribute to citizens’ favorable attitude toward a subsidy. Thus, the following RQ is 10 
proposed: 11 
RQ1: What factors influence a private citizen’s favorability (or unfavorability) toward a 12 
no-vote stadium subsidy? 13 
Citizens may support the public financing of a stadium if they perceive doing so will result in 14 
benefits to the community, including positive economic impact and civic pride (Horne, 2011; 15 
Winfree & Rosentraub, 2012). Additionally, citizens may simply trust policymakers’ motives; in 16 
this case, ordinary citizens may acknowledge their own lack of understanding and defer to 17 
elected officials with greater expertise who they believe will act in ways that reflect the will of 18 
the people. 19 
Despite the common-sense prediction that enacting policies contrary to one’s preferences 20 
will displease a voter, the target (or targets) and extent of this discontent is unclear. Citizens 21 
dissatisfied with public policy may express their dissatisfaction in a variety of ways (e.g., with 22 
antagonism, with apathy) and toward a number of individuals, groups, or institutions (e.g., civil 23 
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servants, policy benefactors, the democratic process). To guide this line of inquiry, a second 1 
research question is proposed: 2 
RQ2: What are the consequences of a private citizen’s favorable (or unfavorable) 3 
assessment of a no-vote stadium subsidy? 4 
Answers to these RQs contribute to the academic study of both sport and public policy by 5 
providing insight into the no-vote subsidy, an understudied, yet common, phenomenon. 6 
Policymakers in these cases are under no legal obligation to acquire the consent of local citizens. 7 
In the absence of a constitutional mandate, policymakers are able to enact legislation without the 8 
direct approval of the public. Dissenting citizens are commonly afforded the opportunity to 9 
petition and introduce a referendum, and in most cases, have failed to initiate such an apparatus. 10 
In spite of these facts, it is unsurprising that many are uneasy with the evasion of public opinion 11 
that this phenomenon seems to represent. 12 
The sociopolitical connection between democracy and stadium finance is discussed 13 
further below. First, a review of literature will highlight the role of direct democracy in 14 
American governance and its application to the sport-facility financing process. Based on these 15 
theoretical foundations, a conceptual model of the public response to the no-vote subsidy will be 16 
presented. Additionally, a series of research constructs and related hypotheses will be proposed. 17 
This model and the accompanying hypotheses will be used to set an agenda for future research, 18 
which is outlined in the concluding section. 19 
Theoretical foundations 20 
Direct democracy 21 
In this paper, democracy refers simply to the fundamental idea that a society should be 22 
governed by the will of its people. When it comes to legislating, the will of the people may be 23 
NO-VOTE STADIUM SUBSIDIES                                                                                             6 
expressed by elected representative legislators or by direct popular vote on a proposed piece of 1 
legislation. The foundations for this democratic idea can be found in the work of classical 2 
theorists of democracy like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham, and John 3 
Stuart Mill, all of whom argued for the sovereignty of the people (Peonidis, 2011; Tuck, 1999; 4 
Turner, 2010; Waldron, 2002).1 Its echoes are clear in the philosophies of early framers of 5 
American democracy such as Thomas Jefferson (Bernstein, 2003). 6 
Will of the people can be understood simply as the majority preference. Adopting 7 
“majority rules” as an expression of will of the people is not without controversy. For example, 8 
Shapiro (2003) cited “poor quality of decision making, low levels of participation, declining 9 
legitimacy of government, and ignorant citizens” (p. 22) as evidence that the popular vote is an 10 
imperfect tool of democracy. Despite these challenges, the popular vote has been accepted 11 
throughout democratic nations as a tool to quantify the people’s will (United Nations General 12 
Assembly, 1948). Furthermore, initiatives and referendums held throughout the United States are 13 
decided by majority vote, as are elections of representatives (Magleby, 1984). 14 
The contemporary challenges of democracy include limiting the influence of special 15 
interests (“When Other Voices Are Drowned Out,” 2012), attenuating citizen cynicism in the 16 
political process (Caldwell, 2006), and reengaging voters (Norris, 2004). Today, the American 17 
people’s contempt of government is expressed through historically low approval ratings of 18 
Congress (Rampell, 2011), calls for term-limit and campaign finance reform (Dionne, 2012; 19 
Pearson & Kidwell, 2009), growing support of third-party candidates (Goebel, 2002), and recall 20 
elections (Davey, 2012). 21 
In addition to statewide issues, the initiative and referendum have been utilized locally at 22 
the city and county levels on issues ranging from tax levies to permitting liquor sales on Sundays 23 
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(Cronin, 1989). As has been the case in a number of past stadium-financing issues, propositions 1 
seeking to increase city or county tax rates often are justified as a way to obtain additional 2 
revenues necessary to finance professional sports venues, convention centers, performing arts 3 
theaters, or other public-assembly facilities (Petersen, 2001). Both the initiative and the 4 
referendum as instruments of democracy are generally supported among the American public at 5 
all levels (i.e., city, county, and state; Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2007). Furthermore, a majority 6 
of Americans favor the idea of a national referendum (Smith, Tolbert, & Keller, 2010). The 7 
national referendum is a tool common in most other democratic nations and could range in uses 8 
from advising policymakers to arbitrating during congressional impasses (Cronin, 1989). Despite 9 
its popularity, direct democracy has also been the target of a fair share of criticism (Fort, 1999). 10 
Over the past 2,500 years, little has changed in the talking points of critics and defenders 11 
of citizens’ direct participation in government affairs. For example, in The Republic, Plato 12 
rejected the citizen-centered democracy of ancient Athens. He argued that permitting uninformed 13 
citizens to participate in matters of government alienated those with leadership and knowledge—14 
in other words, those most capable of governing. Furthermore, he argued that ordinary citizens 15 
might fall prey to the influence of special-interest coalitions, a concern common among 16 
contemporary critics of direct democracy (Held, 2006). 17 
Aspects of these historic roots can be seen in contemporary concerns with voter 18 
competence. Modern political thinkers believed an active and involved society is the foundation 19 
of a sound democracy (Held, 2006). Opponents of direct democracy agreed, but contended that 20 
the ideal citizen—one armed with the knowledge and motivation necessary to contribute to 21 
public policymaking—was nothing more than make-believe. Walter Lippmann, a Pulitzer Prize-22 
winning newspaper columnist, championed this idea in his influential book The Phantom Public: 23 
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“For when public opinion attempts to govern directly it is either a failure or a tyranny” 1 
(Lippmann, 1925, p. 71). For Lippmann and others—like political scientist Joseph Schumpeter 2 
(1943), who said “the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede” (p. 283)—3 
placing responsibility in the hands of an uninformed and apathetic public would only produce 4 
chaos. 5 
Despite the criticism that the initiative and referendum are poor tools of democracy, the 6 
American people have largely advocated for the continued accessibility of citizen-led 7 
propositions. As Cronin (1989) noted, their merits notwithstanding, the contemporary arguments 8 
against the tools of direct democracy are unlikely to supplant the initiative and referendum. In 9 
addition to the tools themselves, polling has indicated that people generally favor the outcomes 10 
produced by popular votes (Matsusaka, 2004). These outcomes have included tax and 11 
expenditure cuts and restructuring public financing from a tax-based system to one based on user 12 
fees. 13 
Although the role of direct democracy in public-stadium finance is of central importance 14 
in this paper, it must be acknowledged that an active and involved citizenry can be realized using 15 
other democratic methods. For example, as chronicled by Scherer and Sam (2008), the public 16 
forums held to deliberate the subsidization of a rugby stadium in Dunedin, New Zealand, 17 
exemplify one method to foster citizen participation in issues of governance. Still, while the 18 
referendum and the initiative are not unique tools of the American democracy, a precedence of 19 
using direct democracy to decide U.S. stadium-finance issues supports the argument that many 20 
American citizens are accustomed to voting on such projects (Brown & Paul, 2002; Dehring et 21 
al., 2008; Mondello & Anderson, 2004). As discussed below, however, direct voter participation 22 
is becoming increasingly exceptional. 23 
NO-VOTE STADIUM SUBSIDIES                                                                                             9 
Politics and the no-vote subsidy 1 
Since 2005, less than one-sixth of all North American stadium projects have been directly 2 
approved by voters (Kellison & Mondello, 2014). The no-vote subsidy includes any instance in 3 
which a stadium (or more broadly, any project) receives public financing without the direct 4 
approval of voters, and it can occur in one of two ways: (1) no vote is held or, perhaps more 5 
egregious, (2) a proposal is rejected by voters but the subsidy occurs anyway. Although this 6 
study focuses on the no-vote subsidy as a means of public financing since 2005, its use predates 7 
this timeframe, including in Seattle in 1995 and Pittsburgh in 1997 (Mecham, 2006).  8 
The Pittsburgh case, in which a plan was approved to subsidize two sports facilities after 9 
voters rejected a public financing plan six months earlier (Dvorchak, 1998), was highlighted in 10 
testimony given at congressional hearings for the Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation 11 
Act of 1999. One witness, then-state representative Andrew Carn, expressed concern that 12 
Pennsylvania decision-makers circumvented the democratic process and were hypocritical in 13 
their ideologies regarding the use of the tools of direct democracy: 14 
The…most disturbing [aspect] of the Pennsylvania stadium experience is the exclusion of 15 
the public. In 1997, the people of Pittsburgh and the 10 surrounding counties voted 16 
against public financing for stadiums, yet public money is being spent on stadiums. 17 
In Philadelphia, some people want to provide school choice and others want the 18 
public to have a choice on riverboat gambling, yet many of these same proponents of 19 
public choices on issues vehemently oppose public choice in stadium financing. 20 
In fact, I offered southeastern Pennsylvania voters a choice on stadiums when I 21 
offered a referendum measure on the House floor in June. The Republican 22 
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Appropriations Committee indicated the referendum would not cost the State any money, 1 
and the cost to the city was minimal. 2 
My proposal was defeated 101 to 97, with many southeastern Pennsylvania 3 
Representatives, including some Philadelphians voting against the measure. Some of my 4 
colleagues have a lot of explaining to do, because many of them voted to allow the 5 
Pittsburgh referendum then turned around and voted against their own constituents 6 
having the opportunity to have their say on this issue. (Stadium Financing, 1999) 7 
For Carn, it did not make sense for the same legislators who valued direct democracy in some 8 
cases (e.g., riverboat gambling) to circumvent a public vote in stadium-financing propositions. 9 
His objection was further strengthened by the fact that a referendum had failed in Pittsburgh, 10 
only for policymakers to find an alternative public funding mechanism. 11 
Arguably, the most radical use of the no-vote subsidy in recent history occurred in 12 
Charlotte in the early 2000s. In 2001, Mecklenberg County voters defeated a referendum (57% 13 
no) to use existing hotel and motel occupancy taxes and new car rental and county seat taxes to 14 
construct an uptown arena along with a number of other projects (Mecklenberg County Board of 15 
Elections, 2001). A year later, however, city councilmembers voted by a count of eight to three 16 
to raise $265 million in municipal bonds for the construction of a new arena. During 17 
deliberations, many of the councilmembers noted that the new plan was not the same as the issue 18 
rejected by voters in the year prior. On the other hand, dissenting councilor Harold Cogdell 19 
lamented that the city council’s deal directly affronted the democratic process by ignoring voter 20 
sentiment. The following excerpt captures his apprehension: 21 
First and foremost, when you are given an opportunity to participate in government’s 22 
decision-making process, like it or not, the will of the people must be adhered to by our 23 
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governmental leaders. In today’s [Memorandum of Agreement], circumstances and terms 1 
are different than they were when the referendum was presented to the voters, but 2 
[Councilmember Cogdell] does not believe the terms have so substantially changed that 3 
the will of the voters should be disregarded. In every election, we all like the outcome of 4 
some races and we are disappointed by the outcome of others, but the results must be 5 
adhered to. That is the fundamental principle on which democracy is founded. 6 
Convenient exceptions to this principle jeopardize the very democratic fabric that makes 7 
our nation great. (City Council of the City of Charlotte, 2002, p. 592) 8 
Each of the voting councilmembers was certainly aware of the previous year’s public vote, but as 9 
the outcome of the council’s vote showed, the majority of the council did not perceive the new 10 
actions to be problematic. 11 
The sections above provide the foundation for the conceptual model presented next. From 12 
a practical standpoint, this model may aid understanding of the impact of the no-vote subsidy on 13 
citizens’ attitudes toward policymakers and the professional sports team. Additionally, this 14 
model may be useful in approaching the consequences of the no-vote subsidy from an idealistic 15 
perspective—that is, how cases of no-vote subsidies impact ordinary citizens’ attitudes toward 16 
democracy. Below, these concepts are defined in further detail and introduce the conceptual 17 
model and associated hypotheses. 18 
Conceptual model 19 
The public’s response to a no-vote subsidy is conceptualized in the multistage conceptual 20 
model presented in Figure 1. The first stage of the public response concerns a citizen’s attitude 21 
toward the policy. Within the context of a public stadium-financing policy, two antecedents (i.e., 22 
perceived stadium impact, trust in government) are theorized to influence an individual’s support 23 
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of a financing plan. The second stage analyzes the direct outcomes of a citizen’s favorability or 1 
unfavorability toward the stadium-financing plan. The variables of interest in the second stage 2 
include team consumption intentions, congruence with democratic norms, and attitude toward 3 
policymakers. The final stage is concerned with implications for democracy and contains two 4 
variables: political apathy and voting intentions. Moderating variables appear throughout the 5 
model and include political ideology, team identification, and political apathy. 6 
Unlike other examinations that have compared individual characteristics with the 7 
electoral outcomes of a public stadium-financing issue (e.g., Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2012; Coates 8 
& Humphreys, 2006; Dehring et al., 2008; Fort, 1997; Mondello & Anderson, 2004), this model 9 
is intended to serve ex post analyses focusing on the reactions of individual citizens. Past 10 
research has been dedicated to determining why a stadium initiative or referendum passed or 11 
failed (e.g., Brown & Paul, 2002; deMause & Cagan, 2008; Horn & Fort, 2009; Paul & Brown, 12 
2001; Trumpbour, 2006). Certainly, this line of research has merit: millions of dollars have been 13 
spent on stadium-financing campaigns, stadium-financing issues often polarize communities, and 14 
ill-advised stadium subsidies can wreak havoc on local (i.e., city, county, regional) economies 15 
(Kellison & Mills, 2013). In cases of no-vote subsidies, there may be other consequences felt by 16 
individuals, groups, or institutions. Policymakers who allocate public funding toward a stadium 17 
through a no-vote subsidy may satisfy the immediate goals of “saving” teams, jobs, or 18 
businesses, but there may be other unintended and anticipated consequences. 19 
--------------------------------- 20 
Insert Figure 1 about here 21 
--------------------------------- 22 
 23 
 Public votes on stadium-finance issues are often preceded by contentious and costly 24 
political campaigns (Curry, Schwirian, & Woldoff, 2004; deMause & Cagan, 2008). Of course, 25 
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stadium-subsidy advocates also have to face the possibility that the electorate will reject a public-1 
financing plan if it appears on the ballot. The no-vote subsidy, on the other hand, represents the 2 
path of least resistance. On the surface, the no-vote subsidy allows a stadium project to receive 3 
public appropriations while policymakers (and the team) can avoid any political wrangling. 4 
However, in cases of unfavorable no-vote subsidies (i.e., in which voters would have defeated 5 
the subsidy plan if given the opportunity), the negative consequences may be more severe than 6 
suspected. In the model presented in this section, these penalties may become more apparent. 7 
Stage 1: Antecedents of policy support 8 
The public response to a no-vote subsidy is predicated on a citizen’s favorability or 9 
unfavorability toward the actual financing plan. The first stage represents an individual’s 10 
formation of attitudes toward the plan, the focus of RQ1. The outcome variable is support of 11 
financing plan, which is simply defined as an individual’s favorability or unfavorability toward 12 
the actual terms of the stadium-financing plan. Support of financing plan should not be confused 13 
with one’s attitude toward the act of providing a no-vote subsidy. For example, although an 14 
individual may argue the plan should have been approved via a public vote, she or he may 15 
nevertheless agree with the specific financing details. To determine how first-stage attitudes 16 
develop, two antecedents of an individual’s support of the financing plan are proposed: the 17 
perceived stadium impact and trust in government. 18 
Perceived stadium impact is defined as a multidimensional construct measuring a 19 
citizen’s assessment that a sports facility—as a provider of professional sport and 20 
entertainment—produces meaningful tangible and intangible benefits for the community. Pro-21 
subsidy advocates have claimed a community receives a number of benefits from its local 22 
stadium and sports teams, and these benefits are reaped by citizens regardless of whether they 23 
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attend the city’s sporting events (Johnson, Groothuis, & Whitehead, 2001). Here, and in all 1 
usages hereafter, the term local is meant to encompass citywide, countywide, or multi-county 2 
issues. Past stadium-subsidy cases have fallen under each of these jurisdictions, and hypotheses 3 
related to “local issues” in this article are versatile enough to be applied to any of these 4 
categories. 5 
Previous research related to stadium referendums indicates that voters support public-6 
financing issues when they anticipate benefits gained from attracting a new professional sports 7 
team or penalties avoided from the relocation of one of the city’s existing teams (Mondello & 8 
Anderson, 2004). Other research has shown that pro-subsidy campaign spending has influenced 9 
the outcome of the public vote (e.g., Blair & Swindell, 1997; Brown & Paul, 2002; Paul & 10 
Brown, 2006). These campaigns highlight the positive benefits expected from a new or 11 
renovated stadium and sometimes also highlight the potential consequences of a failed 12 
referendum. These findings suggest that, the trustworthiness of the campaigns’ communications 13 
notwithstanding, citizens favor public-financing plans when expected benefits are clearly known. 14 
Based on the findings in past stadium-election investigations, the following hypothesis is made: 15 
H1: The perception that the value of the stadium is high will have a positive impact on a 16 
citizen’s support of the public stadium-financing plan. 17 
The second hypothesized antecedent of a citizen’s support of a public stadium-financing 18 
plan is trust in government. The link between public trust in government and public support of 19 
policies is commonsensical. Historically, however, public trust has been treated as a dependent 20 
variable; that is, people’s trust in government depended on their favorability in the policies 21 
enacted (Dancey, 2012). Scholars have also provided empirical evidence, however, that a 22 
citizen’s trust or distrust in government has political consequences. For example, Hetherington 23 
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(1999) found that when distrustful of government in general, voters tended to penalize incumbent 1 
candidates in elections. As Hetherington (1998) observed, “Rather than simply reflecting 2 
dissatisfaction with incumbents and institutions, declining political trust contributes to this 3 
dissatisfaction, creating an environment in which it is difficult for those in government to 4 
succeed” (p. 791). Past research has indicated that in order for citizens to support government 5 
policies, they must have trust in the government (Hetherington & Husser, 2012; Rudolph & 6 
Evans, 2005). The same relationship is expected between a citizen’s trust in government and 7 
support of the stadium-subsidy plan, as indicated in the following hypothesis: 8 
H2: Trust in government will have a positive impact on a citizen’s support of the plan to 9 
finance a professional sports stadium using public funds. 10 
A citizen’s trust in government may originate from his or her belief that a policymaker is 11 
behaving benevolently rather than out of self-interest. In a prior study of political decision-12 
making, Kellison and Mondello (2014) observed that elected officials justified unpopular 13 
stadium-finance decisions by extolling the virtues of civic paternalism, actions believed to serve 14 
the best interests of the local collective, regardless of whether those actions were contradictory to 15 
public sentiment. Supporters of civic paternalism share the assumptions of representative 16 
democracy advocates: that the individual voter does not have the capacity (by choice or by lack 17 
of accessibility) to act on behalf of the entire community. In a case like Charlotte (discussed 18 
previously), civic paternalism may have enabled policymakers to justify their public financing 19 
plan, a decision that appeared to conflict with the wishes of the community collective. 20 
Similar to a philosophy of civic paternalism, citizens exhibiting great trust in government 21 
assumes leaders possess greater knowledge that informs their decision-making, and that these 22 
leaders will act in ways that maximize the public benefit. On the other hand, a citizen lacking 23 
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trust in government may question the policymaker’s base of knowledge or motives. Though the 1 
concept of civic paternalism has only recently emerged in the literature, there has been much 2 
consideration of the roles of knowledge and trust in government (cf. Caldwell, 2006; 3 
Grundmann, 2008; Turner, 2008), both of which are important aspects of an individual’s trust in 4 
civically paternalistic leadership. It is not enough for a leader to possess omniscience; citizens 5 
must also trust that policymakers will act based on the interests of all, and not the policymakers’ 6 
own self-interests. Some of this judgment may come from a policymaker’s legislative record, 7 
including the previous utilization of a no-vote subsidy (and its effectiveness). 8 
It is important to emphasize that the authenticity of a policymaker’s civic paternalism is 9 
subject to the judgment of voters. That is, whether an elected official genuinely governs in the 10 
best interests of the collective is irrelevant, particularly in a model designed to gauge voter 11 
attitudes. In reality, policymakers may support a stadium subsidy for a number of reasons, 12 
including backing the urban growth machine (Delaney & Eckstein, 2007) or pursuing their own 13 
self-interests (Santo, 2010). Based on H2, it is posited that a voter’s attitude toward a stadium 14 
subsidy is dependent upon one’s level of trust in the policymaker, rather than the policymaker’s 15 
actual motive. 16 
A citizen’s favorability or unfavorability toward a stadium-financing issue has 17 
historically been expressed via a vote of yes or no in a local election, and this outcome has been 18 
the focus in past research. In some ways, the huge importance placed by citizens, the media, and 19 
scholars on electoral outcomes has veiled the possibility that other implications may follow from 20 
a voter’s attitude toward a stadium-financing plan. In the following section, other potential 21 
outcomes associated with voter opinions are discussed. 22 
Stage 2: Direct outcomes 23 
NO-VOTE STADIUM SUBSIDIES                                                                                             17 
In the second stage of the public response to a no-vote subsidy, citizens may change their 1 
views of individuals, groups, or institutions to match their own assessments of the financing 2 
plan. These targets may include the policymakers directly responsible for the plan or the 3 
stadium’s primary tenants, whose involvement in the actual planning may be more superficial. 4 
Additionally, citizens may view the policymaking process as more or less congruent with 5 
democratic norms based on their favorability or unfavorability toward the financing plan. These 6 
concepts were originally raised in RQ2. 7 
It is important to consider how the primary beneficiary of the plan—in most cases, the 8 
professional sports team—is perceived by the public following a no-vote subsidy. As suggested 9 
in H1, a citizen who supports the public stadium-financing plan is expected to ascribe value to 10 
the facility, and by extension, to its primary tenant. After all, a team’s financial predicament is 11 
often the impetus for the intervention by local policymakers. 12 
Team consumption intentions are simply the expectation by citizens that they will engage 13 
in future consumer behavior of the stadium’s primary tenant. Such behavior may include 14 
attending a game, purchasing licensed apparel, following a game through a television or radio 15 
broadcast, or tracking the team’s progress in the local news. Stadia are strongly intertwined with 16 
their teams; as Underwood, Bond, and Baer (2001) noted, sports facilities are “tangible 17 
representations of the brand” (p. 7). In past public stadium-funding debates, anti-subsidy groups 18 
have called into question the existing wealth of team owners (Mondello, Schwester, & 19 
Humphreys, 2009) and perceived inaccessibility of major professional sport to the lower and 20 
middle classes (Collins, 2008). Still, despite the arguments levied against teams and public-21 
financing plans, past research has shown that teams benefit from a short-term surge in attendance 22 
after opening a new facility (Clapp & Hakes, 2005). This phenomenon, known as the 23 
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honeymoon effect, exists regardless of whether a stadium is built primarily through public or 1 
private means (Coates & Humphreys, 2005). This effect suggests anecdotally that if public anger 2 
about a public-financing plan exists, it does not surface in the form of diminished consumer 3 
behavior. Based on the belief that public attitudes toward the public stadium-financing plan will 4 
influence the favorability or unfavorability of the team in the same way it will policymakers, the 5 
following hypothesis is offered: 6 
H3a: Citizen support of the public stadium-financing plan will have a positive impact on 7 
personal team consumption intentions. 8 
Based on this hypothesis, a sports team’s vested interests extend beyond the stadium 9 
subsidy itself. When citizens are supportive of a no-vote stadium subsidy, their excitement 10 
toward a new or renovated facility will manifest to some degree in the form of increased 11 
attendance. On the other hand, if a no-vote subsidy is deemed inappropriate by citizens, they may 12 
withdraw from activities related to the subsidy’s primary benefactor (i.e., the team). Take, for 13 
example, the recent case of the Miami Marlins, who received a $490-million no-vote subsidy for 14 
a new ballpark that opened in 2012 (Hanks, 2014). The no-vote subsidy was so heavily 15 
scrutinized that it prompted an investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 16 
and the eventual recall of Mayor Carlos Alvarez (Hanks, 2014; McGrory & Rabin, 2012). 17 
Attendance at Marlins Park has also declined much more quickly than expected, a sign of what 18 
has been called “the worst fan rejection of a new baseball stadium in at least a generation” 19 
(Hanks, 2013, para. 2). 20 
In cases where a stadium’s primary tenant is a professional sports team, citizens with 21 
previous affinity for the team are expected to be less influenced by unfavorable personal views 22 
of the financing plan than those with weak connections to the team. To characterize the level of 23 
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support of the team prior to the approval of the stadium-financing plan, the model uses citizens’ 1 
team identification, or “the social identity that a group of people (i.e., fans) have in common in 2 
relation to their favorite sport team” (Kwon, Trail, & James, 2007, p. 541). Citizens showing past 3 
support for the team are expected to maintain their levels of support (through consumption 4 
intentions) regardless of the financing plan under the rationale that without the financing plan, 5 
the team could have relocated to another city. Conversely, citizens possessing even an apathetic 6 
attitude toward the team are predicted to find the team unfavorable if they also disapprove of the 7 
financing plan. Therefore, it is hypothesized that citizens’ support of the team prior to the 8 
financing plan—measured through their attitudes toward the team—influences the strength of the 9 
relationship between plan support and consumption intentions: 10 
H3b: A citizen’s attitude toward the team will moderate the relationship between support 11 
of the public stadium-financing plan and team consumption intentions such that as 12 
attitude toward the team increases in favorability, the positive relationship between 13 
support of the public stadium-financing plan and team consumption intentions will 14 
strengthen. Alternatively, as attitude toward the team decreases in favorability, the 15 
positive relationship between support of the public stadium-financing plan and team 16 
consumption intentions will weaken. 17 
Past research utilizing the contingent valuation method (CVM) provides tangential support for 18 
this hypothesis. Through the CVM, researchers are able to quantify intangible benefits of a 19 
stadium, team, or event by asking study participants to predict their willingness-to-pay (WTP) in 20 
order to attract a new sports team or keep an existing team from relocating (Johnson, Mondello, 21 
& Whitehead, 2007; Johnson & Whitehead, 2000). In CVM analyses using cities with existing 22 
professional sports teams, individuals with an interest in the team expressed higher WTP in order 23 
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to avoid the team’s relocation to another city (compared to those without an interest in the team; 1 
Johnson et al., 2007; Mitchell & Carson, 1989). This finding suggests fans of the team may be 2 
more tolerable of an unpopular policy, so long as it keeps the team from relocating. 3 
In addition to affecting an individual’s attitude toward the team, a citizen’s support of a 4 
policy may also have political implications, including changing perceptions of policymakers and 5 
democracy in general. Congruence with democratic norms is defined as the perception that the 6 
will of the people is manifested in public policies. As stated in the theoretical foundations 7 
section, the argument that all decisions should be made via direct democracy is atypical; instead, 8 
most theorists believe that direct democracy methods should be complements to a representative 9 
system. Both methods allow the will of the people to be exercised, as noted by Magleby (1984). 10 
However, representative methods in which elected officials enact policies without the direct vote 11 
of citizens provide greater opportunity for policymakers to govern in a manner that does not 12 
reflect the people’s will.2 13 
Based on this line of reasoning, it is expected that an individual who supports the public 14 
stadium-financing plan will, when prompted, express belief that the policymaking process is 15 
consistent with democratic norms. In this scenario, the policymaking process is viewed as 16 
consistent with democratic norms because the citizen’s will (i.e., support of the plan) is reflected 17 
in the policy. On the other hand, a citizen unsupportive of the financing plan is expected to view 18 
the policymaking process as incongruent with democratic norms under the rationale that the local 19 
leadership has undermined the people’s will. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 20 
H4: A citizen’s support of the public stadium-financing plan will have a positive impact 21 
on the personal assessment that the local political process is congruent with 22 
democratic norms. 23 
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Attitude toward policymakers refers to a citizen’s approval or disapproval of the local 1 
government entities directly responsible for the development and approval of the public stadium-2 
financing plan. The above hypothesis highlights an important implication of perceived 3 
democratic incongruence for policymakers. Although they may have achieved the goal of 4 
stabilizing the team’s—and as extensions, the stadium’s and city’s—economic situation, 5 
policymakers may also have put their political futures in jeopardy. If policymakers are indeed 6 
trustworthy, the confirmation of H4 will highlight the risk taken in approving an unpopular 7 
stadium financing plan. 8 
In a case of direct democracy, public opinion can be best measured by the passage or 9 
defeat of an initiative or referendum. In no-vote subsidies, policymakers act as proxies to direct 10 
democracy by themselves acting on behalf of the citizens. These policymakers include the city 11 
mayor or manager, city councilmembers, county commissioners, and state legislators. In general, 12 
a citizen will favor a policymaker when agreeing with the policies enacted by that elected 13 
official; conversely, when an elected official enacts policies that a citizen opposes, the citizen 14 
will view the policymaker less favorably (Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011; Hetherington, 1999; 15 
Stimson, 2004). Policymakers’ involvement in controversial plans can complicate their re-16 
election bids, while involvement in favorable policies can leave their political standing intact 17 
(Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010; Carson, Koger, Lebo, & Young, 2010; Jacoby, 2009; 18 
Weisberg & Christenson, 2007). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 19 
H5a: Personal support of the public stadium-financing plan will have a positive impact on 20 
a citizen’s attitude toward local policymakers. 21 
Although a citizen’s support of the financing plan is predicted to influence his or her 22 
attitude toward a policymaker, it must be acknowledged that other factors contribute to a 23 
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citizen’s attitude toward policymakers. The most obvious of these are other positions or 1 
decisions with which a citizen may agree or disagree. Furthermore, in the past 20 years, scholars 2 
have observed a rise in voter partisanship in which a citizen’s attitude toward a public official is 3 
heavily dependent upon shared political ideologies (Bafumi & Shapiro, 2009; Fiorina & Abrams 4 
2008; Jacoby, 2010). In this study, political ideology refers to a citizen’s liberal or conservative 5 
tendencies toward social and economic issues. Historically in the American two-party system, 6 
fiscal conservatives have shown a greater propensity to oppose government spending and 7 
taxation (Dyck, 2010). However, in public stadium-financing issues, political support has come 8 
from both sides of the aisle (Sapotichne & Smith, 2011). Still, a citizen is more likely to have a 9 
favorable opinion of a policymaker when they share the same political ideology, regardless of 10 
that elected official’s approval of a fiscally liberal policy. Thus, the following hypothesis is 11 
proposed: 12 
H5b: A citizen’s political ideology will moderate the relationship between support of the 13 
public stadium-financing plan and the attitude toward local policymakers such that 14 
as a citizen’s political ideology corresponds to that of the policymaker, the positive 15 
relationship between support of the public stadium-financing plan and favorability 16 
toward local policymakers will strengthen. Alternatively, as a citizen’s political 17 
ideology moves away from that of the policymaker, the positive relationship 18 
between support of the public stadium-financing plan and favorability toward local 19 
policymakers will weaken. 20 
Furthermore, policymakers are expected to feel the implications of a policymaking 21 
process that does not align with democratic norms. In cases in which citizens deem the decision-22 
making process to be democratic, policymakers are expected to be viewed favorably. 23 
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Alternatively, when citizens perceive policymaker actions to be incongruent with democratic 1 
norms, citizens may show less favorability toward the offending policymakers. Thus, the 2 
following hypothesis is made: 3 
H6: A citizen’s assessment that the local political process is congruent with democratic 4 
norms will have a positive impact on the personal attitude toward local 5 
policymakers. 6 
The second stage of the model of public response focuses on direct, attitudinal outcomes 7 
of a citizen’s favorability or unfavorability toward the public stadium-financing plan. The final 8 
stage centers on the democratic consequences of a citizen’s Stage 2 attitudes. As discussed 9 
below, unfavorable opinions of the policymaking process or policymakers may lead to troubling 10 
implications for policymakers and for the democratic process altogether. 11 
Stage 3: Implications for democracy 12 
An active and informed citizenry is a central tenet of Jeffersonian democracy, and this 13 
involvement is important regardless of whether citizens participate by voting on issues directly 14 
or through elected representatives. Schneider, Jacoby, and Lewis (2011) argued, “citizens’ 15 
beliefs and attitudes about governmental activity comprise a central element in their overall 16 
orientations toward the political system” (p. 2). This concept is addressed in Stage 3, which 17 
explores how opinions formed in the previous stages influence citizens’ attitudes and behaviors 18 
related to civic engagement and the democratic process. 19 
In this study, political apathy refers to a particular state of mind wherein there is a lack of 20 
feeling, passion, or interest toward political issues (Davis, 2009). A citizen’s political apathy 21 
may result from a number of factors, including the perception that one’s government is 22 
inadequate (Emmerson, 2012). A dysfunctional or illegitimate government can spur myriad 23 
NO-VOTE STADIUM SUBSIDIES                                                                                             24 
reactions from the polity, ranging from organized demonstrations to increased apathy (Useem & 1 
Useem, 1979). Concerning the latter, Rosenberg (1951) argued that apathy emerges from 2 
citizens’ perceptions that they have no influence in public policy. 3 
As suggested in H6, citizens who perceive a financing plan to be undemocratic may form 4 
negative opinions of the affiliated policymakers. For similar reasons, these individuals are 5 
expected to perceive the local democratic system as broken. Although some citizens may feel 6 
empowered to change the political process (such as the protesters mentioned by Useem and 7 
Useem), in general, most are predicted to become more apathetic toward local government. On 8 
the other hand, those who believe a financing plan to be democratically conceived will not 9 
experience apathy. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 10 
H7: A citizen’s assessment that the local political process is congruent with democratic 11 
norms will have a negative impact on political apathy. 12 
Voting intentions is defined as a citizen’s personal expectation to participate in 13 
forthcoming elections. In Stage 3 of the model of public response, voter intent is measured by an 14 
individual’s engagement in or refrainment from political participation (i.e., voting). Studies of 15 
voter turnout have revealed a number of reasons why citizens participate in elections, including 16 
to vote for a highly favorable candidate or to vote against a highly unfavorable candidate (Harder 17 
& Krosnick, 2008). In cases of so-called “democratic deficiency,” citizens lack confidence that 18 
their civic participation is reflected by the government (Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011). 19 
Voters have reacted to unresponsive governments by expressing their displeasure in subsequent 20 
elections, thereby producing higher voter-turnout numbers (Sinclair, Hall, & Alvarez, 2011). 21 
Additionally, political campaigns that highlight the plans of a political challenger as well as the 22 
poor performance of an incumbent candidate have induced voter behavior in the forms of 23 
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increased voter registration and increased actual voting (Brader, 2006; Marcus, Neuman, & 1 
MacKuen, 2000; Southwell, 2012; Timpone, 1998). 2 
A similar response is expected in the conceptual model. The stronger a citizen’s attitude 3 
toward policymakers (regardless of whether the attitude is favorable or unfavorable), the more 4 
likely the citizen is to participate in forthcoming elections. In other words, a voter with strong 5 
positive feelings toward a candidate will vote in order to elect or re-elect that candidate, while a 6 
voter with strong negative feelings toward a candidate will vote in order to prevent that official 7 
from winning an election. The following hypothesis is provided to reflect this prediction: 8 
H8a: A citizen’s attitude toward policymakers will have a curvilinear, U-shaped 9 
relationship with personal voting intentions, such that as a citizen’s attitude toward 10 
policymakers moves away from a neutral position (toward either extreme), the 11 
intention to vote will strengthen. 12 
Of course, a citizen with strong voting intentions implies that the individual lacks apathy 13 
toward political participation. The definition of political apathy connotes a lack of interest 14 
toward political issues, and the literature shows that apathy decreases voter turnout (Eliasoph, 15 
1998; Southwell, 2008). Therefore, the following hypothesis is made: 16 
H8b: Political apathy will moderate the relationship between a citizen’s attitude toward 17 
policymakers and voting intentions such that as political apathy increases, the 18 
curvilinear relationship between the citizen’s attitude toward policymakers and 19 
intentions to vote will weaken. Alternatively, as political apathy decreases, the 20 
curvilinear relationship between the citizen’s attitude toward policymakers and 21 
voting intentions will strengthen. 22 
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As discussed above, despite having many nuances, a common theme inheres in nearly all models 1 
of democracy: the ideal society is one governed by the people. In order for that form of 2 
government to be fully realized, however, citizens must be both informed and actively involved 3 
in the affairs of the community. Thus, public policies that promote the withdrawal of citizens 4 
from the political process may be considered contrary to the spirit of democracy. 5 
The multistage model presented above reflects the various attitudinal and behavioral 6 
responses of citizens affected by a no-vote stadium subsidy. In Stage 1 (RQ1; H1–H2), attitudes 7 
toward the no-vote-subsidy policy are formed based on how citizens perceive the sports facility 8 
itself and their trust that leaders are knowledgeable and will serve the best interests of the 9 
community. In Stage 2 (RQ2; H3–H6), citizens’ attitudes toward the team, the policymaking 10 
process, and policymakers themselves are informed by their favorability or unfavorability toward 11 
the financing plan. Then, depending on their attitudes, these attitudes can culminate in political 12 
apathy or voting intentions, as reflected in Stage 3 (RQ2; H7–H8). Each of the aforementioned 13 
hypotheses are designed to contribute to a better understanding of how local citizens respond to 14 
stadium subsidization, particularly when legislation is enacted without public approval. 15 
Concluding remarks 16 
While some have argued that the no-vote subsidy is simply an alternative exercise of 17 
democracy—after all, policymakers are elected by their constituents to legislate—others raise the 18 
concern that such governance fails to mirror the public will. In the absence of a public 19 
referendum or initiative, it is also how the public will is gauged, or even if the public will is 20 
meaningful to policymakers. The conceptual model presented in this paper represents an initial 21 
attempt to address these and other sociopolitical aspects of the no-vote subsidy. 22 
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From a superficial perspective, the no-vote subsidy is a straightforward approach to 1 
public-stadium decision-making: the case for a new or renovated stadium is made (usually by the 2 
team), elected officials deliberate and vote on a financing package, and the public at large is kept 3 
outside the sphere of influence. In cases where the public is either supportive or ignorant of a 4 
stadium subsidy, the fact that the decision was made without the tools of direct democracy is 5 
somewhat trivial. On the other hand, if the electorate is largely opposed to the stadium subsidy, 6 
frustration over the absence of a referendum may manifest in various ways. For teams impacted 7 
by a no-vote subsidy, sport managers must be cognizant of the possibility that locals (fans and 8 
non-fans alike) will express their dissatisfaction by spending less money on tickets, merchandise, 9 
and team-related media. Elected officials may also face implications from an unfavorable no-10 
vote subsidy. As an immediate consequence, they may face public censure, as was the case for 11 
Miami Mayor Carlos Alvarez. Subsequent election bids could also become more contested, 12 
thereby requiring incumbents to raise more campaign money to combat the subsidy-related 13 
criticisms of challengers. Finally, citizens might distance themselves from political participation 14 
altogether, thereby reducing the efficacy of American democracy. Such a decrease in citizen 15 
involvement is problematic for those with an interest in safeguarding the democratic process. 16 
As suggested in the conceptual model, policymakers may reconcile unpopular decisions 17 
if it is believed they are acting in a form of democratic representation known as civic paternalism, 18 
in which policymakers rely on their own expertise and judgment rather than the perceived public 19 
preference. Though ultimately immaterial in the public-financing decision, public perception of 20 
the subsidy may not be inconsequential. Subsequent testing of this model may show how voters 21 
feel about the stadium-financing agreement influenced their attitudes toward the stadium’s 22 
primary tenant, democratic decision-making, and local policymakers. 23 
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Moving forward, the various stages of the proposed model should be evaluated and, when 1 
applicable, improved. One method through which such improvement can be made is empirical 2 
testing of the model. Survey research and secondary voting data may be integrated to examine 3 
the relationships proposed in the model. As part of the empirical testing, a psychometrically 4 
sound scale is required. Considering that at least one of the variables in the model has not been 5 
used previously (e.g., support of financing plan), a portion of the scale development process will 6 
include the generating of new measurement items. 7 
The results of empirical testing would have several practical implications, including 8 
illustrating how the popularity or unpopularity of a no-vote subsidy could impact the group 9 
standing to benefit from a new stadium the most: the professional sports team. Clearly, the team 10 
has a vested interest in the outcome of a stadium-subsidy debate. For owners and team 11 
management, securing the capital necessary to rebuild or renovate an arena, ballpark, or stadium 12 
eliminates any uncertainty about the team’s future in a city. Intuitively, it might seem as though 13 
the team faces few consequences when a no-vote subsidy is awarded. However, empirical testing 14 
of the conceptual model may indicate the team also has an interest in the public’s attitude toward 15 
the financing plan. That is, even when a subsidy is awarded without direct public consent, the 16 
team may alienate potential consumers or be penalized with an abbreviated honeymoon period. 17 
The conceptual model also has broad implications for elected officials and advocates of 18 
increasing public participation in civic issues. 19 
The frequency with which no-vote subsidies occur has been unmatched by critical 20 
scholarly inquiry of the phenomenon. Although each city involved in the stadium-financing 21 
debate has its own unique characteristics, the multistage model proposed in this paper provides a 22 
general outline of the hypothesized antecedents and consequences of public opinion related to 23 
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the debate. Additionally, this model contributes an understanding of the role of civic paternalism 1 
in the formation of public attitudes. As noted throughout this paper, these attitudes may extend 2 
beyond ones directed toward stadium tenants and policymakers associated with no-vote 3 
subsidies. 4 
Future empirical work, arriving from many directions, should consider these outcomes. 5 
From a scholarly perspective, researchers should endeavor to engage in interdisciplinary research 6 
moving forward. It is difficult to appreciate the nuance and complexity of the no-vote subsidy 7 
from any one perspective, and incorporating knowledge from a wide range of disciplines can 8 
bring to light new ideas for evaluating the merits of public-stadium financing and the democratic 9 
process. The aim of this interdisciplinary approach, then, should be to engage the academy, 10 
policymakers, activists, team executives, and ordinary citizens in such worthwhile debate. 11 
12 
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Footnotes 1 
1. Considering the scope of this paper, broad interpretations of each of these theorists’ 2 
writings are adopted in order to identify common themes and to operationalize a working 3 
definition of democracy. However, it must be acknowledged that there are considerable 4 
differences between each of these theorists’ philosophies, including their views on the 5 
role of participation in democracy. Many of these differences are outlined in Pateman 6 
(1970). 7 
2. Some proponents of civic paternalism argue that the will of the people need not be 8 
reflected in public policy. Indeed, because of the civically paternalistic leader’s 9 
omniscient knowledge, the leader’s decision-making is not informed by what people 10 
desire most, but rather, what is best for the people. For more on this argument, see Chiu 11 
(2002). For the purposes of this study, it is unnecessary to determine the merits of the 12 
systems of democracy and civic paternalism. The population of interest in this model is 13 
the citizenry, and therefore, it is their opinions about no-vote subsidies and congruence 14 
with democratic norms that matter most. 15 
16 
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